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PREFACE 
This paper has been produced as part of IIASA's hazardous waste manage- 
ment work, which is the main component of the Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies project. The overall aim of this work, reflected in this 
paper. is to systematize our understanding of interactions between institu- 
tional and technical factors in policy making and implementation. The 
influence of institutional processes upon technical knowledge built into policy 
has been increasingly recognized. However, it has yet to be adequately clarified 
in comparative research on different regulatory systems. Institutional struc- 
tures canot be easily transplanted from one culture to another. Nevertheless, 
through the normal flux of policy, institutional development slowly occurs any- 
way. in more or less ad hoc fashion. Comparative insight may help to direct 
reflection and adaptation in more deliberate and constructive ways. 
This paper forms one draft chapter of an intended book on hazardous waste 
management. The reader will therefore notice references t o  other draft 
chapters in this study which are also being circulated separately, and which are 
available from IIASk A full list is given overleaf. At this stage the papers are 
drafts, and are not intended for publication in present form. They are being 
circulated for review and revision. 
I would like to  thank those policy makers and others who have exchanged 
papers and information with us, and those who generously gave of their time 
and experience in the many interviews which form a substantial input to this 
work A full list of acknowledgements will eventually be published. 
Brian Wynne 
Research Leader 
Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies 
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CHAPTERSEYEN: 
SLJMbiARY. INTERPREX'ATION AND mJRTHER PROBlXMS 
Brian Wynne 
In this  concluding chapter we will first review the scope, aims and 
approach of the  IIASA hazardous waste study. then summarize the main insights 
- analytical and practical - that  have arisen. We will then discuss what seem 
to  be the most important further problems, and ask what policy-linked research 
could help to resolve them. 
Scope. Aims and Approach 
This study has attempted to make constructive practical contributions to 
policy in three areas. The first two relate specifically to hazardous waste 
management the last being more general: 
1. Acting through our research practice as a new conduit for exchanges of 
information and insights amongst practitioners, especially given ILASA's 
position, between those from Hungary and other countries we have dealt 
with; 
2. Analysing the implementation processes in several countries, and 
offering policy suggestions as to  institutional options and constraints in 
the  better allocation and effective use of scarce regulatory resources; 
3. Analysing the validity of dominant notions of "policy" and "manage- 
ment", espcially their assumptions about the  role of technical knowledge 
and the  nature of uncertainty. This has developed not only from our 
research on hazardous waste, but from our collective expertise from other  
areas, from an  expert summer study a t  IIASA in 1983 on regulation, and 
from sister research in the IIASA group on himalayan deforestation a s  a 
regulatory problem, and technical and institutional dimensions in energy 
policy modelling. 
Although i t  is based on theoretical arguments (as well as empirical data), 
we still call the third dimension a practical policy contribution, because i t  
would have concrete effects if the  analytical perspective offered were ever 
taken up  in policy. Although this perspective is general, i t  was particularly 
sharply shown for the hazardous wastes issue. I t  was also appropriate to  view 
hazardous wastes in this broader analytical frame for two further reasons: 
(i) hazardous waste forms a basically continuous problem domain with 
other  conventional industrial pollution and ordinary waste issues even 
though (see chapter one) i t  contains some strikingly different s tructural  
properties. The overall distribution of pollution between air, water and 
land, and whether it  is dispersed and diluted, or  attemptedly destroyed, or  
contained, is rather arbitrary. Historical contingent processes and events, 
institutional boundaries established for other reasons, etc. create (and 
shift) policy and technical partitions which belie the underlying integra- 
tion. 
(ii) the issue is ripe in the sense tha t  various countries are  in the very 
midst of attempting for the first t ime to implement legislation, or a re  
reviewing the  experience of the  first round of implementation attempts 
over the last few years. Furthermore, the issue has arrived a t  the interna- 
tional policy level, has not ye t  reached the  depths of entrenchment and 
political conflict seen In other issues, but is steadily moving there. Yet as 
we have argued, hazardous waste management remains in need of a 
coherent strategic definition a s  a framework for policy; and international 
level policy planning needs more  analytical clarity about the internal insti- 
tutional workings of the national or more local systems on which effective 
international policies depend, t o  define the constraints and opportunities 
for international regulation. 
For all these reasons, now is  an appropriate time t o  engage realistic 
analysis with policy planning and negotiation, from a slightly different angle 
than previous work, and in the  light of further experience. As emphasized a t  
the outset, for reasons of professional background and deliberate strategy our 
approach has differed from that  of others in the hazardous waste field. It is also 
necessary to  stress again tha t  we deliberately se t  out to  examine national and 
subnational institutional-technical dimensions of policy, especially implemen- 
tation, a s  a ne cessary foundation for subsequent phases of research and policy 
making directly a t  the  international level. We do not claim to have produced 
absolutely fireproof proposals and arguments even a t  national levels. Neverthe- 
less we a re  in a position to put forward some modest observations. 
The analytical approach 
The practical starting points for our research were: (a) tha t  international 
policy agreements are  more difficult t o  achieve, and - if apparently achieved - 
more difficult to  implement than previously recognized; and (b) tha t  national 
policies also suffer lack (or redirection) of implementation a t  the local levels 
where real actions and effects happen. The widespread "enforcement deficits" 
or implementation gaps [I] recognized by environmental policy analysts raise 
the  specter not  only of wasted policy resources,  but  worse, of withdrawal of pub- 
lic acceptance (or more accurately perhaps, of passive tolerance) from policy 
bodies and  processes which manifestly fail to fulfil their  formal goals and prom- 
ises. 
In international te rms  the corresponding realisation t h a t  many "policies" 
a r e  not planted on the  ground, bu t  flutter around in mid-air. as symbolic ges- 
tures ,  [2] encourages a cynicism a n d  protective self-interest which threa tens  
fragile movements towards be t te r  international policy negotiation agreement  
and  genuine enactment.  In addition to  these concerns,  we were aware t h a t  
many of t h e  problems of policy implementation were not due t o  inadequate 
technical howledge,  bu t  to  the  insti tutional mechanisms for putting i t  t o  
effective use, in contexts of conflicting organisational constraints, interests  
and  rationalities. Although technical  knowledge might also be inadequate. 
whether this  is so is itself a varying judgement,  determined by institutional fac- 
tors,  as  is t he  question of which kinds of technical knowledge i t  i s  necessary t o  
develop for policy. 
We therefore se t  out t o  clarify the  connections between institutional 
processes. and  the development a n d  uses of technical  howledge,  for example 
in  scientific analysis and classification of risks. This a t tempt  to find a n  
integrated perspective on the  interaction of social and technical dimensions of 
policy problems seemed to u s  t o  be a n  appropriate challenge for applied sys- 
t e m s  analysis, and t o  be more rooted in t h e  real world than  approaches which 
ignore the  institutional dimensions. 
Summary of Main Points 
I. Analytical lnsights 
U n i v e r s a l  a n d  local  f a c t o r s  in e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c y  
Cross-national policy research cannot claim to  produce universal solutions 
to  policy problems. Comparative analysis does not imply evaluation of 
strengths and weaknesses of individual systems, the  identification of some 
rneta-systemic ideals and principles. and adaptation towards a common interna- 
tional system. I t  may identify specific regulatory instruments or arrangements  
which could be effectively transferred from one context to another,  but the  
accepted currency of comparative research [3] is tha t  specific instruments.  
technical norms and so on are dependent for their  effectiveness on a surround- 
ing institutional web, whose most significant features are often specific t o  a 
given cul ture,  and may not be immediately apparent. The policy usefulness of 
such research lies in analysing the na ture  and extent of this local context- 
dependence, to  enlighten practical awareness of what institutional possibilities 
for adaptation and improvement exist, both domestically and with respect to  
international harmonisation initiatives. 
In Chapter one we therefore identified the  essential properties of the  
hazardous waste issue - especially its packaged nature, lowly history, and 
social-technical heterogeneity - which will exert themselves in all regulatory 
institutional frameworks. A matrix was suggested which has orthogonal dimen- 
sions, of (i) different objective, universal issue-properties, and (ii) different pro- 
perties of individual political-regulatory cultures, such as  use of universal, pre- 
cise numerical standards versus flexible, case by case standards; t h e  extent  of 
judicial oversight of regulatory decisions; t h e  strength of sectist, fragmentary 
tendencies i n  political affairs, etc. 
I t  was pointed out  tha t  the  formulation of technical policy responses to  
issues frequently assumes that  there  is a single, natural definition of t he  prob- 
lem, thus  a natural frame of reference shaping those technical responses. Yet 
despite some universal underlying properties, issue-definition is the focus of 
multiple organisational interests and plural perceptions, and a continual his- 
torical process of negotiation and adaptation. [4] 
Issue- definition and  multiple agendas 
Looking a t  the  emergence of hazardous waste a s  a formally recognized 
'issue' needing official policy attention, (see especially Dirven's Dutch case- 
study) we noted tha t  even apparently unitary issue-definitions embodied in 
legislation and  policy instruments,  reflect contending institutional forces 
(including resistance to official policy-recognition) which have not only laid 
certain s tructural  constraints into t h e  policy in reflection of their  perspectives 
and influence, but  continue to influence the  subsequent practical interpreta- 
tion of ofEcial policy frameworks into implementation or non-implementation. 
These influences reflect s t ructural  factors, such as  administrative boundaries 
and relations within government. institutionalised general financing arrange- 
ments  between central and local government, o r  government a n d  industry. 
They are  not  always chosen o r  deliberate strategies. Furthermore. t he  basic 
s t ruc ture  of policy has t o  accomodate such legitimate conflicts and may well be  
able to do so only by using technical definitions. classifications o r  standards 
wihch are  inherently ambiguous and  imprecise, to  allow for flexibility in t h e  
continua1 negotiation of such  conflicts. Technical precision or definitional clar- 
ity may  not  equate with rationality or  optimality in  policy. 
The Dutch case studies showed two particularly interesting aspects of t h e  
connections between this  political public agenda-manipulation process and pol- 
icy implementation in the  hazardous waste issue. 
Because of i t s  general  structural property (being packaged and  concen- 
trated) hazardous waste regulation, unlike conventional pollution, first needs a 
new industry  ( t r ea tmen t  and  disposal) t o  be established. In the EMK-UNISER 
case a Dutch company was allowed to  act  illegally for years  with. a t  least, stu- 
died cen t r a l  government  neglect, despite repeated at tempts  by the local 
authorities t o  control or  close the  company. Central government put  pressure 
on the  local authority not  t o  submit the company t o  existing environmental 
laws. The government  did not want the issue t o  be publicly recognized - nor 
locally enac ted  - a s  a risk management issue, because i t  was preparing legisla- 
tion in  t h e  usual relatively private and controlled way, a n d  anyway i t s  dominant 
concern was t o  c r ea t e  an adequate new industrial T&D infrastructure. The only 
existing e lements  of th i s  were one or two companies such  a s  EMK (and later  
UNISER), which therefore had t o  be sheltered even if this  meant  defending the i r  
dubious operations from a risk management view of t he  issue. Conflict between 
two basically different problem-definitions and  their  institutional carr iers  was 
endemic. The implementation of the Dutch Chemical Waste Act of 1979 is  still 
~ a r a l y s e d  by the  lack of a domestic industrial T&D infrastructure.  
The second aspect  was illustrated in t he  implementation of the  Interim 
Dutch Soil Sanitation Act. which arranged for government subsidies t o  help 
municipalities clean u p  hazardous past dump sites. (See van Eindhoven e t  al. 
case study). Although central  government laid down what i t  thought were very 
clear, technically precise rules  for local authorities t o  establish priority sites 
to  submit  t o  central  government  for approval, t he  local municipalities' decision 
making rationality was not a t  all consistent with central  government's, for very 
solid insti tutional reasons. For example, in t h e  Act, t h e  municipalities were 
expected t o  pay 10% of t h e  clean up costs plus an extra  (population-rated) pro- 
portion. The r e s t  would be central subsidy. However the  reality i s  t h a t  t he re  
are many parallel lines of financial support from central to local government- 
typically about 200-for all sorts of local projects. Some of these - perhaps 
house or road-construction, tree-planting, renovation, a new school, - could be 
obstructed by a dump clean-up operation if on or near  the site, and the  finance 
(and jobs) stopped. Local prioritization of sites is therefore coloured strongly 
by these (and other) considerations, which tacitly pervade the  local interpreta- 
tion of the 'objective' central technical criteria, in which formal language the  
prioritisation returns for central approval. Part  of the  pat tern of course, is a 
concern for public health, but as the cases show, especially where the  evidence 
of harm is ambiguous, the local context of implementation can be seen as an 
arena of multiple agenda-building and management according to  solid local 
institutional patterns which shape the  content and practical interpretation of 
technical knowledge. Central policies and agencies create technical- 
administrative frameworks and norms which act  as resources or  constraints for 
local actors, adding t o  an already existing repertoire. They do not by any 
means determine local implementation. 
The full extent of this process of translation between abstract policy and 
real implementation has by now been recognized. Some argue tha t  i t  is often 
only the informal adaptiveness of implementing agents, who actively reshape 
often unrealistic central principles to  practical realities, (which may mean 
severely diluting them) which rescues policy viability. [6] As discussed later. 
this implementation gap straddles a contradiction between central policy 
language and local reality which may to some extent be a necessary point of 
absorption of strain between conflicting social ideals embedded in the  same pol- 
icy. [7] 
Un cer ta in t i e s  
Chapters Two and Three dealt with the topic of uncertainty. policy institu- 
tions and risk assessment. Because this issue is germinal to  the  whole study, 
and leads logically into a discussion of further problems and issues, it is 
separately summarized and interpreted in the next section. 
An important methodological insight developed in these chapters is tha t  it 
is a s  important to  analyse the institutional origins of contending risk- 
definitions, classifications and scientific assertions, a s  it  is to  apply technical 
methods in the hope of resolving them to reach implementable policy con- 
sensus. This is because technical uncertainties are frequently not only much 
larger than recognized, but also being a c t i v e l y  generated by different groups 
choosing different facts t o  observe, committed to different methods of observ- 
ing and reporting, etc. These active processes reflect institutional positions 
and interests, and if technical analysis remains obstinately uncertain it  may be 
worth asking why by looking a t  the institutional patterns of uncertainty- 
generation. This in s t i tu t i ona l  insight will help to clarify t h e  elrzs t ic i ty  of 
asserted uncertainties attaching to factual assertions. By clarifying the scale 
and reasoning behind such weightings, this may facilitate consensus. Under- 
standing the extent of intitutional shaping of facts and uncertainties allows 
better judgements of the  relative policy needs for i n t e r a c t i v e  and t echnica l  
methods and investments as  tools for establishing implementable policies and 
regulatory instruments. 
h s t i t u f i o n s  a n d  Technical f i c t o r s  
Chapter Four described a comparative case study of t h e  institutional shap- 
ing of hazard classifications, to  demonstrate how such technical knowledge is 
designed according to  administrative and other institutional cr i ter ia  relating to  
local contexts of practical use as well as t o  'universal' technical realities. This 
followed u p  similar examples in Chapter Three. Thus technical knowledge may 
in principle be universal, but u s e f u l  technical bowledge  - which is what is 
relevant - may  not  be [8]. The point of this is to show how harmonisation 
between different local regulatory systems - felt to  be a prerequisite of inter- 
national harmonisation - may require more difficult administrative, even cul- 
tural  adjustments  to  be mutually negotiated, not merely technical adjust- 
ments.  If a s  i t  should be, this is judged unlikely, it might  in t u r n  lead t o  t he  
conclusion t h a t  policies and  procedures should be geared towards reducing t h e  
burdens on international regulation, not increasing them. 
Dimensions of  D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  
Technical and  institutional factors in hazardous wastes militate in favour 
of substantial  devolution of regulatory control to local authorities.  The 
significance of countless diffuse behavioural  factors is m u c h  g rea t e r  in this  
field t han  in  conventional pollution risk issues. Not only physically diverse 
local situations,  bu t  many decentralized behavioural modes may  switch risks 
from one scale t o  another,  e.g. by deciding to  evade registration, to define a 
'waste' a s  a 'resource', to  mix incompatible waste s t reams,  etc.  etc.. 
If one  were able t o  conduct a sensitivity analysis of end-effects t o  such fac- 
tors ,  they  would in many cases for outweigh kechnical variations o r  uncertain- 
t ies  alone. Behavioural uncertainties are  therefore so significant t h a t  t he  logic 
of regulatory decentralization which already exists t o  ma tch  physical situa- 
tional variations is multiplied by this extra  factor. Chapters Five and  Six dealt 
with two regulatory systems which distribute regulatory resources a n d  respon- 
sibilities in different ways. The FRG and UK are both decentralized, bu t  t h e  
States  of Bavaria a n d  Hessen have "re-centralized" a t  a sub-state level mainly 
in coalitions of local municipalities. 
Chapter Five analysed the  logic benefits and problems of public financing 
and control a t  a relatively local level, especially the impact of pricing policies, 
hazard listing, and a controversial though crucial ins t rument  for them, waste 
export bans. The overall conclusion was tha t  especially for regions with 
dispersed, relatively small industries, such systems were probably optimal. The 
financial problems of public investment in new facilities to establish such com- 
bined regulation-treatment infrastructures a re  very considerable, but  a s  t he  
examples of the  Netherlands shows (and less clearly so, the  UK) private invest- 
men t  is unlikely t o  be a t t rac ted  on a scale to  match requirements ,  unless 
export restrictions more or  less guarantee a domestic market  of wastes. 
The UK is a rather  unique case because of i ts heavy official policy reliance 
upon landfill. The relative cheapness of such methods means t h a t  investments 
in more elaborate t r ea tmen t  plant have been largely abandoned, with 
apparently substantial losses. Two features of UK institutional s t ruc tures  
appear to  be optimal for hazardous waste management, b u t  only if a missing, 
but  crucial third feature existed. 
The two beneficial aspects  are: a flexible, therefore robust  technical risk 
management framework, eschewing unduly precise definitions which would only 
falsify underlying variations and uncertainties and blind regulators t o  the need 
for constant negotiation; and a related decentralization of most  regulatory 
responsibility to  local waste disposal authorities. These are  likely t o  be able far 
bet ter  to know and respond to  local conditions. However t o  bear  such  responsi- 
bilities they need more, direct  access to  the  extensive national technical exper- 
tise potentially'available t o  them,  espcially in a system t h a t  so heavily relies 
upon local site licensing and supervision as a control instrument .  
A further shortcoming of t h e  UK system is its lack of any institutional 
mechanism for coordinating waste arisings and t rea tment  and disposal facili- 
ties, brought about by its extreme regulatory decentralization, and almost 
totally free-enterprise T&D infrastructure.  The costly consequences of th i s  
shortcoming a r e  only avoided because the  system relies upon landfill which can 
more easily tolerate supply-demand mismatches because landfill shortage can 
be relatively quickly overcome, and  landfill excess capacity is not so wasteful of 
tied up capital as  more  expensive plant. The Bavarian system, which involves 
municipalities in financing a n d  managing facilities, is  a very significant exam- 
ple of institutional devolution. Kowever one  mus t  be careful t o  distinguish 
between different institutional d i m e n s i o n s  of decentralisation. The U K  and  FRG 
systems both have well-developed, high quality scientific expertise available a t  
national government level. But t he  F'RG institutional system appears t o  be 
be t te r  s t ruc tured  to  make  this available t o  regional and local regulators,  while 
the  equivalent UK expertise tends t o  in te rac t  directly with industry instead. 
The Dutch system seems t o  have strong, bu t  fragmented national expertise, and  
politically strong but  technically weak local authorities, who anyway have a 
r a the r  unclear  role in regulation. 
Pol i t i ca l  C u l t u r e s  
Some of the main differences between national systems can be be t te r  
understood using t h e  analytical framework of political-administrative cultures.  
These a re  institutionalised styles and  procedures of decision making a n d  public 
policy which a r e  broader than  any given issue, and  which shape i t s  t rea tment ,  
often t o  the  level of affecting specific technical standards. Chapter One gave a 
brief outline and  references t o  the growing body of work in this a rea ,  including 
previous IIASA contributions. In the  present  study we could not systematically 
f rame ou r  research t o  analyse such issues alone, but we were sensitive t o  
relevant empirical questions and  illustrations. Some fragments of insight, and  
fur ther  questions, a re  given here.  
Some anomalies are difficult to explain without a political-cultural frame- 
work. Why for example, is the same ignorance of the mysteries of landfill chem- 
istry which may 'naturally' transform wastes into better or worse products, 
treated as benign in  the UK, but threatening in the US, especially in California? 
Why does the  US insist upon elaborate and precise hazardous waste lists, regu- 
latory criteria and tests, whilst the UK proceeds happily with imprecise, compo- 
site and negotiable technical categories and tests? How can one characterize 
the Netherlands and F R G ,  which lie somewhere between? Thompson, and Wil- 
davsky and Douglas, have offered a cultural explanation of parallel differences 
in other risk areas. [9] This emphasises the  fragmentation of US environmental 
policy making, and the strong role of sects, which have strong social boundaries 
and coercive, egalitarian internal social interaction. Populist culture, the con- 
stitutional separation of powers, individualism and adversary institutions gen- 
erally explain the purchase of such groups in US policy, and their impact upon 
regulatory strategies. Not only does this correspond with elaborate regulatory 
reliance upon precision and standardisation i t  also corresponds with an "all-or- 
nothing" syndrome, evident in the hazardous waste field. Thus, the EPA, 
encouraged by the Congress, attempted to regulate everything in the  field, in 
one go, rather  than to proceed incrementally. I t  is also arguable that  all US 
regulatory decisions are designed to contribute to  the overall enforcement of 
zero-waste production. [lo] However, zealous pursuit of this ambitious ultimate 
ideal leaves many loopholes which appear to  have the parallel consequence of 
widespread uncontrolled disposal. Public processes such as a virtual siting veto 
have the same result - they produce opposite extremes, of industrial innovation 
to reduce waste outputs combined with a present lack of satisfactory control. 
The response to ignorace (e.g. of landfill chemistry) as a natural threa t  is a 
similar underlying social correlate of sectist; cultural styles. These are not cri- 
ticisms of the US system -but  they can be contrasted with other  countries, for 
example the  more flexible, incremental nature of UK policy making generally. 
The uses and styles of science are also shaped by such institutional cul- 
tural patterns. Both the US and the U K  had dominant empirical styles of sci- 
ence in the  19th century.  Practical action was justified by empirical results, 
not theoretical and philosphical reflection as  was more the case in Germany. 
[ll] In the UK t he  utilitarian empirical ethos was institutionalised in industrial 
regulation as  well a s  technical invention, whereas in t h e  US i t  appears to have 
been confined more  to invention. With more integrative policy rituals [12] 
more confident and integrated policy institutions and power elites, and in the  
absence of strong sectist  penetration. UK policy can maintain authority without 
the need for elaborate, precise specific scientific justifications. This leaves 
scientists and policy institutions free to use discretion, to  formulate policies in 
general terms, and to be unafraid of ignorance because i t  is less likely to be 
used as a resource by critics. In the UK, the American (and less so, the Dutch) 
use of precise universal regulatory numbers and tests would be not only curi- 
ous, but was potential institutional threat to  the  position of scientists, because 
i t  would imply a reduction of their discretionary power and a radical 
confinement of their institutional role in policy. This is the cultural underpin- 
ning of the British scientist 's derogatory remark tha t  numerical concentration 
limits for specifying hazardous wastes - as used in some countries - i s  "a sys- 
tem which can be run  by monkeys". [13] 
The FRG appears to  have a similarly authoritative central institutional 
framework for scientific expertise in policy, with hierarchical federal scientific 
bodies free from formal review and criticism, as in  t h e  UK [14]. However 
whereas the  whole network of policy institutions in the UK is hierarchical and 
informally close-knit, the FRG's postwar federal constitution breaks down this 
nexus, placing real autonomy and power on other policy, administrative and 
legal levers (such as  expert-bans on wastes) in the hands of regional govern- 
ments  and  courts.  Even so, strong collectivist cultural norms, as  reflected in 
the accepted authori ty of the  LAGA (the joint corninittee of s ta te  waste experts), 
and significant industrial  voluntary compliance underlie, and  defend the 
effectiveness of formal regulatory arrangements.  
The Netherlands is a n  interesting and complex case for comparative politi- 
cal cultural analysis. Although it has typical European features of 
parliamentary-executive fusion, the Netherlands also has  long traditions of 
coalition government which (unlike single party government) requires issue- 
by-issue negotiation of parliamentary and cabinet votes. This tends to  
encourage single issue oriented politics, which is also a dominant feature of US 
political culture.  Fur thermore  the Netherlands government administration 
unlike the  UK, is f ragmented a t  the central level (the "tubed" policy system), 
with more radial interest-group penetration into individual Ministries, and 
more strategic leaking of confidential policy information. Public interest 
envirorlmental groups a r e  articulate and influential with even formal recogni- 
tion in government advisory committees. Scientific expertise is, like t h e  US, 
and unlike the  UK and FRG, well-distributed amongst contending interests.  This 
pluralist political cu l ture  has  s t ructural  affinities with t h e  US, (although infor- 
mal Dutch government - industry collaboration is more  close-knit and 
coherent),  and  produces similar regulatory results. For example there  seems 
t o  be an "all-or-nothing" syndrome in t h  Dutch inability thus  far  t o  establish a 
T&D infrastructure, despite progressive legislation in 1979, and in the  Dutch 
use of precise concentration limits and, numerical soil cleaning standards a s  
regulatory instruments  in this  field. 
It may also be significant t ha t  only the  Dutch and U S  policy systems have 
raised the past dumps issue to  the  s t a tus  of official legislative recognition. 
Such relatively extreme formal react ions,  followed by implementation 
difficulties which suggest the  description of that  reaction as symbolic poIitics, 
is also a feature of strongly sectist-dominated political cultures. 
These insights remain speculative and partial, but they do suggest underly- 
ing patterns to  different institutional behaviours including the  shaping of 
technical knowledge, which have very concrete  policy results. More systematic 
understanding in this domain would help t o  clarify what is universal and open 
to  international unification, and what is not. The historical understanding of 
such cultural-institutional pat terns would also allow a bet ter  understanding of 
their  deeper timescales of change and evolution. 
11. Practical Policy Implications 
We have deliberately titled th is  section implications ra ther  than conclu- 
sions, because they are  naturally tentative. Also there is no full distinction 
'analytical' and 'practical'. The foregoing analytical summary and the  previous 
chapters, contain many practical implications, a t  different levels. I have picked 
out  here what seem the most important  a n d  concrete. The reasoning and data  
from which they are  derived has already been given. 
1. Mechanisms of coordination between regulatory divisions need to be sta- 
blished so as  t o  connect hazardous waste management with conventional emis- 
sions control problems. In particular,  incorporation of the  hazardous waste 
management implications of tightening conventional emissions standards for 
air. or water will significantly shift the  optimal balance either: 
(a) towards increased dispersive emissions, or (given that  this  is unlikely); 
(b) away from waste production and containment altogether, towards more 
upstream integration of waste reducing criteria in investment decisions. 
A loophole in this ne t  is the possible movement of production to places with less 
progressive regulatory controls. 
2. Given the  extreme heterogeneity of the  hazardous waste field, regula- 
tory strategies and instruments  in a single system probably need to be 
differentiated and specifically targeted towards different industries, different 
kinds of waste and &Rerent scales of activity. Note t h a t  this is not  equivalent 
t o  decentralization of policy making and enactment .  
3. Technical risk assessment can be a valuable policy tool in this field. 
However, i t  is important for analysts and  users to  understand the  twin pres- 
sures: 
(i) t o  justify specific institutional commitments  and  decisions; and 
(ii) to legitimate general organisational power and roles by tending to 
absorb and  transform scientific ignorance institutional uncertainties, la tent  
conflicts, into definitions of problems and uncertaint ies  which falsely imply 
tha t  singular management  frameworks in probabilistic models and risk analysis 
techniques can fully cope with them. Critical policy attention is therefore 
essential to  the r o b u s t n e s s  of applied risk management  techniques especially to  
behavioural indeterminacy and divergent risk-system definition. This may 
limit t he  scope of such techniques, but  also produce more economy of techni- 
cal effort by reducing the  perceived feasibility of and need for elaboration and 
technical precision. 
4. Policy makers should not  underestimate the  pressures of organisational 
self-justification o r  legitimation outlined above, nor  t h e  potential backlash in 
public reaction and non-implementability if technical RA is allowed institution- 
ally to  become too much of a symbolic exercize. Mechanisms of third party 
justification will have to  be established which avoid this. Policy processes and 
para-policy initiatives which develop public understan&ng of uncertainties,  and 
open acknowledgement of their  extent, a re  likely to be important.  This is a 
universal factor underlying, and modulated by interaction with specific political 
cultures and regulatory processes. 
5. Realistic policy acknowledgement of the extent  of situational variations 
in hazardous waste management ,  and of the extremely tenuous na ture  of regu- 
latory data,  would favour grea te r  institutional integration of policy making and 
implementation. This would also mean more devolution of responsibility t o  
local institutions a n d  regional coalitions. However th i s  is only feasible if cen-  
t ra l  governmental plays a n  active advisory role, making necessary investments  
in general scientific and  engineering research, and  arranging for this  general 
expertise to filter into,  and  integrate with local experience and information. 
This should n o t  be seen a s  a "top-down" s tructure,  s ince local expertise is just  
a s  important as  cent ra l  expertise, and local situations are the  points of practi-  
cal integration. 
6. I t  is  difficult t o  implement devolved regulatory responsibility without 
some coordinated control of t he  planning, investment and management  of 
necessary t rea tment  and  disposal facilities, t o  ensure adequate matching with 
waste arisings. Except where sanctioned facilities a r e  relatively cheap  and 
simple-which is t rue  virtually nowhere except t he  UK--some form of commun- 
ity financing seems inevitable. Private enterprise alone has not been enough, 
given the  inherently unstable and commercially risky na ture  of waste t rea t -  
m e n t  and disposal market.  given tha t  the  waste marke t  is so  d r e c t l y  t ied t o  
regulatory strqtegies and  standards, extension of regulatory responsibility for 
facility planning and  management  is logical. Joint financing and management  
partnerships between local authorities and waste generators  (facility users) 
may be an optimal institutional arrangement. 
7. Public financing of T&D infrastructure has been resisted allegedly 
because i t  transgresses the  polluter-pays principle enshrined in official policy 
language. However in reality this principle is more a framework of interna- 
tional negotiation as to  how far and how explicitly the strict market economic 
dogma embedded in it  can be evaded. I t  is more pragmatic to  view public 
financing of facilities as temporary deficit financing of an infrastructure and 
policy whose success should ensure i ts  own eventual termination, as  regulatory 
pressure "upstream" gradually encourages industry t o  change its production 
decisions to produce less waste. Compared to the  huge costs of cleaning up 
past dumps, this deliberate policy strategy is far less demanding of public 
resources and over the  long t e rm is likely to sustain more public confidence in 
regulation. This self-inflicted redundancy is the acknowledged aim of Bavarian 
policy for example. 
8. Generator-partnership in local or regional facilities may be enough to  
ensure tha t  enough waste comes to  he facilities to  maintan their viability. 
However t h e  availability of cheaper, though maybe less acceptable alternatives 
such as  exports has  been found elsewhere to  undermine the  viability of such 
investments public or private. Therefore mandatory export restrictions may 
well be necessary to  protect such investments and actually establish a viable 
waste t rea tment  and disposal system, which is the  primary condition of ade- 
quate management. 
9. Bearing in mind point 2 above, it  is necessary to discriminate between 
wastes which. for optimal management may need to  be exported, and those 
which may be exportable or being exported but where this is not necessary. 
Thus export restrictions t o  maintain viable T&D facilities do not need to be 
absolute and indiscriminate. 
10. However the conclusion of our research, especially of chapters three  
and  four, is t ha t  international regulatory harrnonisation a t  a technical level, 
e.g. of hazard classifications, identifying tests and analyses, is intrinsically lim- 
ited by local administrative-cultural factors built into national or s tate  regula- 
tory criteria.  Since administrative harmonisation is not realistic, and since 
this  lack of consistency is a central reason for the  ineffectiveness of interna- 
tional regulation for  hazardous wastes, the  logical conclusion is to find ways of 
restricting international transportation of hazardous wastes to  the  extent pos- 
sible. 
11. This logic coincides with the foregoing logic of maintenance of viable 
T&D infrastructures.  The aim should be t o  identify those kinds of waste which 
have a high "attention-coefficient"; for example, high "value" (e.g. high risk, 
t hus  high value of proper control); need sophisticated t reatment  or special 
facilities (e.g. ex salt mines) not available everywhere; and are  low volume 
therefore reducing transport costs. An appropriate analogy might be spent 
nuclear fuels. The slim resources and technical resolution of the international 
sysiem could then be effectively concentrated upon th is  narrow band of wastes. 
leaving o thers  which would only confuse and dissipate international regulatory 
attention t o  domestic infrastructures. 
Of course, the  transport and 'political' risks of such  movements of high 
attention-coeficient wastes would have to  be taken in to  careful account, but  
the  concentration of international regulatory at tent ion produced by such 
discrimination a s  proposed above would be a countervailing positive. The vola- 
tility of public reaction is a further argument  for t he  generally greater  resili- 
ence of a grea ter  reliance on domestic facilities. 
12. Finally. a conclusion of comparative institutional research on regula- 
tory systems is t ha t  effort should be devoted to identifying which features in 
t he  regulatory field are  institutionally entrenched in given countries or states,  
and could be built upon as characteristics of tha t  system. This seems to  be a 
better approach than those which imply international unification. Thus for 
example discretionary standards and arrangements which assume strong 
voluntary compliance introduced into the adversary cul ture of US decision 
making would probably be disastrous, without a prior longer t e r m  strategy of 
regulatory devolution (of resources as well as responsibilities) t o  local govern- 
ment.  A better policy for the US might be to clarify, extend and real ly enforce 
waste-producer liability, to  ensure tha t  the producer itself regulates the subse- 
quent fate of its wastes. out of self-interest. 
In t h e  UK on the other  hand, local authorities aready have responsibility, 
but without power and resources. An already-entrenched collaborative cul ture 
could be strengthened by giving local authorities requisite resources to  balance 
negotiations more in the  longer te rm public interest rather  than  by introduc- 
ing alien adversary tools and procedures. Such system-specific optimal policies 
should be clarified and worked out through the use of comparative institutional 
research on political-administrative cul tures underlying regulation. By 
definition these will tend  not to  generate universal concrete solutions or 
improvements, b u t  in rationalising national systems the practical scope for 
international negotiation and harmonisation will be clarified. 
Uncertainty, Policy Institutions and Science - to Repair the Myths 
Bureaucratising Uncertainty 
In chapters two and three we analysed the s ta te  of the a r t  in risk assess- 
m e n t  as i t  has  been applied to toxic chemicals, and hazardous wastes manage- 
ment .  This application is growing, through pressure a t  least t o  justify regula- 
tory policies in public. We showed firstly how all risk analysis, even of 
sophisticated technology, can be pervaded by different precise definitions of the 
technology in question. The range and structure of these differences is not 
arbitrary. It may be based upon equally legitimate, divergent assumptions 
about the s igni f icance  of different parts of the system, e.g. of human and organ- 
isational elements of its real enactment. Examples given ranged from LEG ter- 
minal and nuclear power risks to 2,4,5-T use. The underlying uncertainty in 
producing definitive risk estimates is therefore not so much objective impreci- 
sion, but inherent conflict. This may or may not be amenable to n e g o t i a t i o n  to 
consensus. but it cannot be a n a l y s e d  away. 
If this can be true for relatively highly-defined monolithic systems, as 
chapter two emphasised, how much more significant is i t  for systems like 
hazardous wastes which are extremely heterogeneous-technically and socially. 
The compositions and hazard properties of many hazardous wastes are unknown 
or very badly lmown. This combined with the extreme and largely unknown 
physical situational variations of risks inherent in the  materinls and with the 
fact that these physical variations are  generated by multiplex, autonomous 
human behavioural factors (the waste is packaged and traded) as well as 
natural processes. Worse still, even the same material in the same situation, 
let aone the overall risk system, can be defined very differently, depending on 
whether i t  is seen as a potential resource or a waste, and on what behavioural 
assumptions are made about its handling. Thus for hazardous waste, more so 
than most issues, potential risk-system definitions can vary greatly, even for 
the same waste stream. Nevertheless, in chapter three we identified a t  least 
where the regulatory nodes are in the system, and what broad scope and con- 
straints control options exist a t  each. The sensitivities of system behaviour to 
regulatory signals requires careful research. The lesson is tha t  regulatory 
instruments must remain broad, and be backed up by strong local institutional 
mechanisms of flexible enforcement.  Two more analytical insights from 
chapters  two and three  open up other  practical conclusions: 
(a) Data thought to  be essential for sound regulation a re  intractably 
unreliable, and widely so. Yet their gaping er rors  and uncertainties a re  
atificially shed the more they are used in regulatory institutions. Again, 
this  is exacerbated by intrinsic ambiguities and institutional influences in 
the  definitions of the  materials in question; 
(b) There is a deep conflict between t h e  regulatory need for standardised 
scientific tests to  define materials as  hazardous, and the need to respond 
flexibly with risk assessments to reflect the variants of real exposure situa- 
tions. The unquestionable logic of t he  lat ter  position is contradicted by 
t h e  unquestionable need for manifest consistency, and justification of 
regulatory principles to  third parties. However, even the  elaborate 
specification of scientific methods to t ry  to  make tests  on t h e  same 
material repeatable, may fail to  overcome taci t  informal variations in 
methods and results, quite apart  from the extra  question of t h e  relation- 
ship of t he  test  material and conditions to  real situations. 
Zhmzng uncertainty inside out 
The point about all the  above sets  of ignorance and uncertainty is that ,  
when seen before they a re  artificially digested by organisational processes, they  
appear to  provide a range of possible facts within which estimated differences 
(of risk and  cost for example) between technical options are swallowed u p  
without trace. The kinds of uncertainty described in chapters two and  th ree  
encourage us to  radically a l te r  t h e  received view of uncertainty and science in  
policy (and thus, t h e  received view of policy). This view assumes tha t  t h e  policy 
process is one in which science reveals facts, which then define the  realm of 
policy options. The facts create  the  feasibility space within which policy debate 
can move. Uncertainty makes boundaries fuzzy and enlarges the  feasibility 
space, but  this diminishes with more analysis. If policy commitments  did drive 
any of the  scientific claims, these will be found out  by t h e  procedures of sci- 
ence, and lose credibility. 
This science/facts-policy/values model is a sacred  icon of policy. [15] Yet 
a s  analysis of science in and remote from policy debates has  shown time and 
again, 1161 the shape of knowledge, and  the horizon of uncertainty is permeable 
to  institutional influences (including logic and empirical observation). Apply- 
ing this t o  our issue, wide uncertainties in technical da ta  which a re  strategi- 
cally essential for central  regulatory control, a r e  systematically generated by 
divergent processes of materials-definition, divergent reporting, a n d  classifying 
and situational variations which reflect institutional and  physical realities. The 
horizon of uncertainty i s  not merely due to objective fuzziness around observ- 
able data, but t o  actively generated interpretations and  uncertant ies  which a re  
strategically generated to  clothe institutional interests  and value perspectives 
in a plausible realm of technical possibility. It is a plausibility space ra ther  
than a feasibility space. Tne horizon of scientific uncertainty is being actively, 
if tacitly, shaped in different ways by different groups, pushing i t  ou t  here t o  
embrace a congenial position. pulling it in there t o  isolate an  uncongenial one. 
Of course, in tha t  space there a r e  also scientists busy doing work in which their  
inference choices and  uncertainty judgements do not  have any clearcut  policy 
implications, and some who try honestly to  ignore such implications even if 
they are aware of them. The credibility of others' efforts a t  management  of t he  
plausibility-space will be affected by their  work but  not  determined by it. 
There is an analytical and practical conclusion t o  be drawn from this. This 
is tha t  although technical risk analysis can of course be useful and necessary 
in well-defined, agreed technical problem areas, in less well-defined areas more 
fundamental uncertainties come into play. Some of the kinds of formal ranking 
schemes, standard tests, models and technical risk assessments, for chemicals 
described in chapter three fall foul of this confusion. There is a fundamental 
difference between: 
(i) Risk assessment which examines the technical uncertainties carefully 
and finds they are based on different possible risk-definitions, even 
amongst legitimate experts. 
(ii) Risk assessment which imagines it can nlways reach a unitary techni- 
cal feasibility-space for policy, if not an actual technical resolution. Of 
course many risk analysis questions do arise where there is sufficiently 
close consensus on the  problem. and thus the relevant risk-system. But 
the  consensus is a function of the institutional setting, not the supposed 
objectivity of the risk-definition. 
These approaches should not be mutually exclusive alternatives. The first 
should be a context for and set  boundary conditions upon the second Instead. 
the tendency is for the second perspective to subsume and obliterate the first. 
Much formal RA is driven by institutional pressures which imply single, objec- 
tive problem-definitions. standard situations and precise risk-coefficients (see 
the discussion of standardised tests and synthetic risk coefficients in chapters 
two and three). Yet especially in ill-defined, multiplex issues like hazardous 
waste, without the  analytical distinctions drawn above formal analysis may 
overreach itself, and imply a false degree of tractability to the issue. Because 
the underlying uncertainties are  qualitatively different, this may eventually 
only amplify implementation difficulties. 
Like all social organisations, regulatory bureaucracies and industries,[l?] 
generate systems of belief, including definitions of their problems, wbich legiti- 
mate their positions and roles. Problem-definitions and in this context, risk 
assessment approaches which correspond with their own management  auton- 
omy, and their absorption and  control of an issue will t end  t o  dominate. Indus- 
t r ies ,  which control local situational realities, believe situation-specific RA 
methods a re  optimal; regulatory bodies which need to  justify and defend their 
authority a t  a central  level, believe standardised, synthet ic  methods are  
optimal; institutional systems which are  more collaborative and require less 
third-party justification, need only imprecise, flexible RA methods. With its dis- 
cretionary freedom t o  adapt and compromise, the la t ter  may  be able informally 
t o  absorb behavioural indeterminacies and accommodate some of the  institu- 
tional pluralism which is a major source of technical uncertainties.  Less discre- 
t ionary institutional systems tend more to  repackage radical ignorance and 
la ten t  conflicts as  if marginal probabilities manageable within a ( their  own) sin- 
gle technical-administrative organisational framework. 
There is a n  irony in this  s t ructural  argument  which needs t o  be openly 
faced. Many individual policy makers involved in such processes will argue, 
correctly, tha t  they know tha t  their standardised RA models, tests or  
classifications are  over-elaborate and are  unrealistic. They justify the  use of 
such  'useful fictions' by asking what bet ter  can  be done. They also reason like 
o the r  scientists and formal modellers. tha t  i t  is necessary for the moment to  
use  extremely synthetic concepts and idealised methods, t o  ge t  a framework 
going. Later experience can  refine and develop these initially unrealistic te rms  
and  functions into more complex frameworks, side-loops and  submodels ,  etc.; 
sensitivity analysis can then  begin to  weed out  less important  variables and 
relationships, and we can re turn  t o  a simple, but  by then  more sophisticated 
a n d  fundamentally realistic analytical or  decision-making model. 
The aim is reasonable i n  principle. However in experience such analyses 
frequently become bogged down in the stages of elaboration, which proliferate 
enormously. Progress towards sensitivity analysis, empirical validation, and 
more basic realism dissipates, t he  final target recedes, and  the  analyst andpol- 
icy maker is left dealing 'temporarily' with a permanent  gap between risk 
assessment concepts and  reality. The problem is not  t h e  gap, which is normal 
and  inevitable, and  which individual policy experts recognize. It is tha t  public 
policy language is dominated by the confident expectation expressed in the  
justification [la]. The public policy world only ever hears  the  first 
simplification, of the  ideal a s  seriously taken reality. So despite individual pol- 
icy makers' awareness, the  irony is tha t  the institutional policy level interac- 
tion is dominated by myths t h a t  no one believes. 
Thus, individual experts '  awareness notwithstanding, bureaucratisation of 
uncertainty predominates as  a n  institutional force. This may persist as  a rela- 
tively stable tension in  public policy management. On t h e  o ther  hand, it may 
conceal dynamic aspects of t h a t  tension especially in relation to  risk percep- 
tion and public att i tudes,  which could lead to significant changes and even 
major discontinuities: 
(i) by producing a kind of car icature of science dominated by justificatory 
needs for standardisation, precision, and  so on, and for definitive risk 
results. where even basic science has not yet  demarcated the field. In typi- 
cal hazardous chemicals risk issues, unfulfilled expectations t h a t  science 
will reach consensus t ruths ,  and  proliferating scientific argument  instead, 
leads to external, government or legal intervention even into the  methods 
and inference processes of science. The institutional processes underlying 
such car icatured science also generate  shoddy science, with ill-defined 
expert peer groups, which eventually receives public attention and  back- 
lash. What begins a s  a search  for public authority ends up  undermining 
itself. 
(ii) by understating ignorance in regulation, bureaucratised uncertainty 
will tend to  underestimate the risks and costs in adequate hazardous waste 
management.. Since this exaggeration of management capability and 
understatement of costs refers largely to the "back end", i.e. environmen- 
tal containment, i t  will therefore undershoot in generating formal regula- 
tory pressure to prevent waste arising. This upstream regulation is recog- 
nized as the  best strategy, but resistance is also greatest  there. The insti- 
tutional tendency to  misperceive, and translate ignorance and uncertain- 
ties into anaemic travesties of the real situation is therefore all the more 
problematic in its concrete consequences. 
Regulatory institutions may tend to undergenerate upstream regulatory 
controls even though these may be less costly in a 'total system' sense. How- 
ever there are more than formal regulatory instruments a t  work in influencing 
the  production system and its waste outputs. If we view the  system as 
simplified in Figure 1, there  are two broad feedbacks from environmental 
effects into regulatory responses: scientific and public perceptions of the scale 
and importance of such effects. These clearly interact, but whereas science 
feeds mainly via established institutions into regulatory or  industry bodies (it 
may already be inside them) public reactions are less s tructured [19]. 
However whilst science may often initiate attention to a given chemical 
risk, feedback k the scale and  perceived importance of the  risk and the reac- 
tion to it, is often dominated by feedback B. Furthermore, scientific (and some 
public) signals are channelled and digested by regulatory bodies into formal 
regulatory influences on industry, but the most significant and dramatic 
influences are  usually due t o  public reactions, acting either on regulatory 
- 
*This assumes ignorance is a cost, and there are interesting differences between systems on 
this point. 
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agency or industry, or both. Senior risk management executives in major 
chemical companies have acknowledged that  initiatives in new waste-reducing 
production processes have been much more stimulated by anticipated effects of 
public hostility than by formal regulatory instruments. [20] 
Public attitudes may be volatile, but their possible points of application are 
also more dramatic and discontinuous than normal regulation, such as 
effectivly vetoing facility siting, legal interventions and media campaigns. 
There may be a gradual relentless retreat  of public support through incidents 
which show up implementation gaps and demonstrate the unrealism, shoddi- 
ness or bias of much regulatory risk assessment. This may be encouraged by 
the  excessive bureaucratisation of uncertainties as outlined above, but mani- 
fest itself mainly in discontinuous perturbations of the system, when the dom- 
inant institutional belief systems are (temporarily) ruptured. 
This tentative interpretation opens up the twin areas, of public risk percep- 
tions, and processes of legitimation or justification. These are issues about 
which I have written extensively elsewhere [21], and i t  would be inappropriate 
to repeat much of that discussion here, especially since we did not in this study 
examine siting problems. which is where the question of public perceptions is 
most obviously relevant. However an outline discussion is given in the section 
on h r t h e r  problems. 
Much of the ambivalence of risk assessment discussed above and in 
chapters two and three can be attributed to the fact that  it, like other modes of 
science, is playing two simultaneious roles in policy. Whilst i t  is being used 
instrumentally to solve specific technical questions, i t  is also being used sym- 
bolically to legitimate and justify general institutional authority. These roles 
intertwine and are endemically confused, [22] the lat ter  threatening the  
authenticity of the former. 
In this research we made some preliminary moves towards their disentan- 
glement. Contrary to the assumptions in the sometimes paranoic reactions 
towards such social scientific analysis, the  aim of this is not to suggest that 
scientific risk assessment. cannot, nor should not be done-to the contrary the 
ultimate hope it is to provide it with clearer t e rms  of reference. Nor is it the 
aim to "unmake" taci t  processes of institutional self-justification which often 
pervade technical howledge, as if these are somehow illegitimate. The positive 
contribution is to identify the tensions and weahesses  in such underlying 
processes and myth systems, so that, with longer term institutional viability in 
mind, we might subject them to running repairs. [23] Until we can see them. 
this is difficult. Likewise, in their emphasis of the extreme behavioural and 
technical heterogeneity of hazardous waste management the aim of chapters 
two and three was not to conclude that technical risk assessment does not have 
a useful role. The aim was to show the full extent  of the  vulnerability of such 
RA to public d i sdec t ion  if it overreached its specific contexts (which is what 
the legitimacy function tends to pull it into). because of the ignorance, indeter- 
minism and diversity i t  would be superficially pretending i t  could manage. 
Parther Problems--Linking Research to Policy 
There is of course an  endless list of problems to be researched in hazar- 
dous waste, ranging From scientific research on chemical carcinogenicity, 
through mathematical modelling of environmental systems, to moral philoso- 
phy. In this outline set  of suggestions we have focused upon those issues which 
seem to combine social and technical questions and to be of most relevance for 
international policy making. Although the IIASA research group contained 
expertise in chemistry, materials science and economics, as well as sociology, 
the intellectual slant of our work has been institutional. This is a useful 
corrective to overly technical perspectives which tend to  ignore basic realities, 
bu t  i t  needs to be performed in conjunction, not competition with technical 
perspectives. We have been able to take due account of technical realities and 
uncertainties in our  research. and have benefitled from the  inputs of experi- 
enced  policy makers.  In our view, fur ther  international policy research in this  
a r ea  should take off from our  observation tha t  institutional pat terns  shape 
technical knowledge for regulatory use and t h a t  institutional dimensions hold 
the  key to  better understanding and bet ter  practice. The following are  some 
suggestions. 
1. Attempting to  discriminate between those hazardous wastes for which 
international movements a r e  regarded as essential, or highly beneficial, and 
those which could be acceptably subjected t o  export restriction. The more 
careful and  dispassionate examination of the  (institutional and  technical) 
costs,  benefits a n d  feasibility of such export restrictions as  a policy option 
should be performed for a range of different wastes and industries. 
2. The modes of industrial decision making about hazardous wastes under 
different regulatory regimes a re  extremely badly understood. Yet given t h a t  
t he re  is a substantial amount  of industrial autonomy in this  area, and of "self- 
regulation". even in planned economies, this  factor needs t o  be be t te r  
researched. Orthogonal comparative axes would need to be: different regula- 
to ry  systems. and  different kinds of industry-waste. It  would be especially 
important  to  understand the  industrial perception and response to different 
kinds of external signal, including anticipated public reactions. 
A ra ther  different question is t he  impact of different regulatory systems, 
s tandards and  instruments  upon industry decisions either t o  invest or  no t  in 
hazardous waste t rea tment  and  disposal facilities. What factors influence such 
decisions? Given tha t  many such investments have been failures, how can  t h e  
attractiveness be improved, or is this a misplaced hope without substantial pub- 
lic lead and financial support? 
3. Analyse the detailed generation and use of technical information as a 
resource by different actors in important policy making fora. Examples of fora 
would be siting processes, debates and decisions over standards or hazard 
classifications, and international negotiations over common regulatory 
mechanisms. Specific case studies of given wastes could be used in the  lat ter  
kinds of forum. The aim would be to qualify and improve the  resolution of our 
observation tha t  such technical principles incorporate different administrative 
or  other institutional interests, and to  examine the  extent to  which implement- 
able policy consensus can be achieved by analytical methods or by interactive 
approaches which deliberately "deep-map" the  often tacit  institutional 
interests underlying technical perspectives. [24] A specific comparative case 
would be to  examine the  detailed regulatory use of different hazard 
classification systems in different countries to  see whether and what sys- 
tematic variables relating t o  the  local administrative culture influence the  
technical categories used. This would feed into at tempts to  produce fully 
integrated, cross-referenced international hazard classifications for a regula- 
tory regime. 
4. Technical-institutional risk assessment models could be developed and 
tested for their validity by constructing models akin to  the  U S  EPA's WET 
(Waste-Environment-Technology) model, and analysing the sensitivity of model 
outputs (estimated overall risk) to both technical uncertainties and 
behavioural-institutional variations. Such sensitivity analysis is essential to  
modelling efforts. The latter cold simulate behavioural changes of actors in a 
given system, or  institutional variants be tween  national systems. Either way, 
interactive modelling sessions would be necessary, including real policy actors. 
A further point to study would be the attachability of the constructs of policy 
instruments and risk outputs represented in such models, to real policy sys- 
tems, even if the  models themselves were robust. 
5. As in ( 3 )  above, risk-perception studies have also come to focus upon 
information-processing of policy participants. [25] Although there has so far 
been little such research directly upon risk perceptions of hazardous wastes, 
such perceptions and the dynamics of public attitudes are of considerable pol- 
icy importance. This has been recognized for siting processes for new facilities, 
where some work has been done on information usage, and further work begun 
on compensation mechanisms in the U S  [25]. However, this work has a more 
specific focus than that which comparative work between political cultures 
would allow. For example, in siting processes, comparative questions arise as to 
which actors become involved, at what stages and with what negotiating 
resources and constraints? Cultures may vary considerably as to what are  con- 
sidered acceptable currencies, and limits of bargaining. Furthermore, an 
important dimension usually missing from formal decision-analytic approaches 
to such problems is the cultural-historical one: to what extent are negotiations 
shaped by previous interactions between parties. perhaps institutionalised rela- 
tionships. by cultural experiences and by other problems on actors agendas? 
The narrow precision and voluntarist assumptions of game-theoretic models 
and psychometric methods of risk perception have been extended to  a more 
complex picture of attitude formation and dynamics which incorporates objec- 
tive cultural and institutional factors [26]. 1 have suggested elsewhere for 
example that one might interpret public attitudes towards modern industry, 
technology and regulation as  an institutional relationship dominated by a line 
balance of opposi tesapathet ic  identification and mistrust. [27] In this view, 
disorientation similar to a chronic disaster syndrome descirbed by Ericson [28] 
may best describe the instability of atti tudes, which may nevertheless only 
manifest itself when specific events suddenly crystallise with apparently pent- 
up  force. This speculative notion is advanced here  only to illustrate the  
differences between this and psychometric perspectives, which do not recog- 
nize institutional or cultural factors, even though recent  work is not  incon- 
sistent with such explanations [29]. 
The impact of public atti tudes on siting processes, and the  crucial role of 
these in the  at tempt to effect satisfactory policy, does not  need stressing. This 
is a problem everywhere, creating large perturbations by increasing (legal and 
illegal) exports, over-extending existing disposal routes,  etc.. However the  
same complex and, arguably, brit t le dynaics a re  also a t  work in other  parts  of 
the  system, with potentially equally destabilising results. Thus relatively sud- 
den shifts of public atti tude in response to  events such as  the  lost Seveso waste 
barrels in Europe may produce unexpected political reactions which regulators 
cannot  ignore, yet  which contradict previous policy commitments and under- 
standings between regulators and  industry. An example is t he  political pres- 
sure  to close Frontiers to  hazardous waste movements (an option not available 
e.g. for acid rain), which if so  suddenly enacted would produce very severe 
dislocation and problems in many domestic systems. 
Thus comparative risk perception studies, broadening to incorporate the  
cultural-institutional framework on atti tude formation and dynamics already 
developed a t  IIASA, are  an important analytical need. These should be 
developed through concrete comparable case studies in two o r  more countries. 
6. The estimated da ta  and assertions about t he  costs to  production OF 
more adequate waste management  a re  almost as  "soft" as those about waste 
arisings. They provide no clear guidelines to  policy, a s  to  the  effects of t ighter  
management upon industrial viability. Although efforts should be and  a re  being 
made to  improve such data, they will be inevitably the subject of differing 
methods and assumptions, and confidential control. In the absence of definitive 
guidelines, and anyway large real variations between different industries, 
research should a t  least  monitor arid analyse the  impact of regulation upon 
structural  developments of industry. Which areas of production are being 
transferred to  e.g. "third world" or other countries; which industries appear t o  
be finding replacement processes or products; which appear to  be losing viabil- 
ity, and is this inevitable? This kind of research is already being developed, but  
could profit from at tent ion t o  the institutional context of economic appraisals 
and  decisions. Of course teasing out  separate causes which are aggregated in 
observed trends is a central difficulty; carefully conceived comparative 
research might help in this regard. 
A Hnal Word 
All of the research  ideas outlined above are advanced in the  belief t ha t  a 
basically flawed perspective dominates policy analyses and i ts  inputs to  policy. 
In this perspective facts a re  thought to  be absolute, even if probabilistic, or  
"unrecognized" by policy actors, and values are couched in individual volition. 
Arbitrariness seems t o  threaten should we free ourselves from t h e  moral 
sheet-anchor of single facticity. Yet between these false polarities, unifying 
them by pluralising one a little and reducing t h e  other a lot, is a dimension 
which used t o  be recognized in t h e  analysis of policy before the days of "policy 
analysis" and "applied systems analysis". [30] This is the institutional dimen- 
sion, which res t ra ins  arbitrary choice in our  views of nature or technology. 
"2+2=4" is a n  ins t i tu t ion- i t  also patterns the  way we behave. Solidly objective, 
subtly elaborate institutional networks of norms, expectations, traditions and  
explanations severely limit the capriciousness of supposedly free individual will 
and calculation. There a r e  systematic patterns,  generalisable explanations and  
dynamic order to be found in this mediating institutional domain. 
Practical policy is likely to be best served by research- a t  whatever 
specific level outlined above- which does not delude itself tha t  such inst i tu-  
tional dimensions do not exist, and which does not automatically sha t t e r  t h e m  
into a kaleidoscope of fragmented arbitrary and competing individual wills. 
Realistic policy will be best served by research which first a t  least recognizes 
the institutional dimension, then can  i t  hope to aid in making such institutions 
resilient and just. 
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